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PREVENTING A RENEWABLE RESOURCE CURSE 
Scott W. Lyons* 
INTRODUCTION 
I
n 2007, the largest African oil and gas discovery in a decade 
was made off the coast of Ghana. 1 Aptly named "Jubilee," 
the field produced great excitement for the Ghanaian gov-
ernment. 2 Since production began in 2010, the economic ben-
efits have become entrenched in Ghana's budget.3 Moreover, this 
production is expected to accelerate through late 2016, with fis-
cal estimates already included in national plans.4 However, the 
changes due to the sudden influx of petrodollars from the large 
oil discovery are cause for concern. Recent history demonstrates 
that the rapid flow of large revenue streams into a state with 
weak institutions can produce more harm than good.5 Ghana is 
hastily creating and managing the necessary systems to handle 
its newfound resource wealth to ensure that it does not suffer the 
downfalls of other resource-rich states.6 
The threats to Ghana are real. The sharp increase of non-
tax revenue collection breeds secrecy7 and counters public 
accountability found 
by necessary protections.17 Thus, these states face a potentially 
similar risk ofa resource curse as other resource-rich countries. ts 
This Article explores the risks of new massive inflows 
of wealth stemming from investment in clean and renewable 
energy. First, this Article will discuss the principle of the natural 
resource curse and the combined dynamics that result in negative 
returns on resource wealth. Next, a discussion of the new invest-
ment in renewable energy, the enabling factors for a potential 
clean energy curse, and specific examples that demonstrate an 
emerging concern. Finally, the Article provides potential miti-
gating solutions taken from best practices in traditional resource 
development and government institution strengthening. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
After years of extensive research and examination by econ-
omists and political scientists, there is general agreement that 
states with abundant resource wealth generally perform worse 
than states that have less 
only with transpar-
ency, 8 thus producing an 
establishment ripe for 
corruption.9 Meanwhile, 
the financial windfall 
only accrues to a select 
few, while the national 
per capita income does 
not improve but in many 
cases declines. 10 This 
"resource curse" 11 does 
not have to manifest, 
as some states avoided 
"Known as the resource curse, 
it goes against conventional 
wisdom that something 
providing great wealth and 
revenue is bad for a state 
and its population." 
resources. 19 This greatly 
paradoxical principle, 
which has traditionally 
focused on extractive 
industries such as oil, 
gas, and mining, reveals 
that there are trade-offs 
between resources on 
one hand and economic 
development and poverty 
reduction on the other.20 
Known as the resource 
curse, it goes against 
negative impacts through 
strong institutional protections, but those states are exceptions. 12 
Moreover, some of the same enabling factors apply to the new 
massive investment in sustainable energy solutions.13 
Recently, spurred by international efforts to increase energy 
independence and to combat global climate change, there are 
new and substantial governmental subsidies for renewable and 
clean energy worldwide. They have resulted in large flows of 
investment, both private and public, into this new area of alterna-
tive energy resource development. 14 Initiatives, such as Power 
Ac.. 15 inca, and the South East Europe Energy Community Treaty 
Plan, 16 have brought billions of dollars to areas that are in des-
perate need for energy. However, these areas do not necessarily 
have the institutions nor the infrastructure to absorb this financial 
investment. While these initiatives will add tens of thousands of 
megawatts of cleaner and more efficient power, they may also 
be accompanied by negative effects if they are not accompanied 
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conventional wisdom 
that something providing great wealth and revenue is bad for 
a state and its population.21 While this curse is not an absolute 
law of economics and development, there is a strong tendency 
of negative results.22 Original observations of the resource curse 
reflected more broadly on the macroeconomic impact, such as 
during the 1970s in the Netherlands, leading to the resource curse 
to be termed early on as the "Dutch Disease."23 After the discov-
ery of the Groningen oil fields, the Netherlands experienced a 
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significant inflation of its exchange rate and a subsequent related 
decline in manufacturing, thus increasing dependency on fos-
sil fuel wealth. 24 The applied macroeconomic dynamics of the 
Dutch Disease were a failure to invest in diverse traditional 
tradable commodities like manufactured goods or agricultural 
products and the related infrastructure and education needed to 
produce these type of goods. 25 The movement from a manufac-
turing and agricultural-based economy to one where the labor 
is diverted to resource development raised production costs and 
over time handicapped the economy.26 While the Dutch Disease 
narrowly describes the decline in manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors as a result of a suddenly prosperous natural resource 
sector, the resource curse refers to all hardships that result from 
natural resource exports. 27 
The evolution of the hardships encountered through the 
resource curse began when the nationalization ofresource wealth 
allowed energy-producing 
nations, 36 the resource wealth is accompanied by increased 
secrecy,37 while reducing transparency,38 freedom of the press,39 
and public accountability.40 Since the revenue stream does not 
come from taxes, it is easier to hide income, which eliminates 
governmental accountability41 while quelling dissent through 
patronage systems used to dampen possible rebellion.42 In doing 
so, these nations prevent the common transition to democracy.43 
These factors allow for endemic corruption and governmental 
ineffectiveness.44 Moreover, in less wealthy democracies with 
weaker institutions, weaker legislatures, and weaker legal sys-
tems, very similar outcomes occur.45 In this way, the resource 
curse results from institutional failure,46 making democracies 
less democratic.47 
Despite varied efforts to eliminate discord through reduced 
tax-collection, reduced freedoms, increased secrecy, and 
increased public spending, a major part of the resource curse is 
conflict, including a fifty-
nations to hide their rev-
enues. 28 In the 1960s and 
1970s, states moved away 
from dominance by the 
"Seven Sisters," the seven 
international oil companies 
that controlled ownership, 
investment, and distribu-
tion of mineral resources, 
and began to take control.29 
While the Seven Sisters 
colluded to maintain price 
stability, they also paid 
taxes and royalties that 
were accountable and trans-
parent as sources of gov-
ernment revenue. 30 With 
"Thus, the resource curse 
has a corrosive element 
that makes bad governance 
worse, significantly limits a 
state s institutional capacity 
development, and exposes 
the state to financial and 
political instability." 
percent increase in civil war 
and violent insurgencies.48 
Less wealthy nations have 
a two-fold increase in the 
risk of civil war,49 which is 
even more destructive than 
these statistics show because 
armed conflicts have a high 
risk of restarting. 50 Again, 
there are a multitude of 
triggers, including public 
distrust of revenue-hiding, 51 
financial motivation to 
commit resource-related 
crimes, 52 and newfound 
separatists in the oil-
a change to a new larger scale of revenue through state-owned 
models, and increased secrecy of that revenue, governments 
were no longer held to the same levels of accountability.31 The 
states were then able to subsidize energy internally and provide 
benefits to the population without need for taxation, which has 
the combined effect of pacifying the population.32 Thus, with the 
accompanying lack of transparency regarding the nature of the 
investments and resulting wealth, the government was uniquely 
exposed, from a transparency perspective, to questionable con-
tracts on one side and ill-coordinated decisions regarding capital 
spending on the other side.33 
The recent investigations of the resource curse focus 
~ot oqly on macroeconomic impacts related to exchange 
rates l}nd labor- m~rket~, but more importantly on government 
behavior stemming from the unanticipated large windfall of 
revenue associated with discovery and exploitation of natural 
resources.34 A major component of the resource curse is rentier 
politics. Rentier politics, which occur when a state receives suf-
ficient revenues from external sources, allows a government to 
maintain an illusion of effectiveness through lower taxes and 
higher public spending.35 In autocratic or partially democratic 
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producing region with a 
perceived greater claim to the spoils. 53 Since the 1970s, govern-
ment resource revenues have spiked, leading to a greater risk of 
civil conflict as insurgents have more to gain,54 while the rising 
energy prices encouraged private investors to enter increasingly 
dangerous places, leading to a greater risk of rebellions. 55 Thus, 
the resource curse has a corrosive element that makes bad gov-
ernance worse, significantly limits a state's institutional capacity 
development, and exposes the state to financial and political 
instability. 56 From a government behavior perspective, the curse 
contrasts the Dutch Disease, which has an entirely macroeco-
nomic impact that could be overcome by better broad fiscal 
policy and a diversified economy. 
Discovery of resource wealth has not been a curse for all 
countries. Developed states, such as Canada, mostly avoided the 
curse through income diversification, strong institutions, democ-
racy, and private economic power. 57 While the resource wealth 
has exposed opportunities for corruption, even in developed 
nations, the development of resources has been an overall ben-
efit in those states. Indeed, democracy, in itself, does not ensure 
avoidance of the curse, just as it does not ensure comparative 
increases in government expenditures to raise the quality of life 
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of its population. 58 Corruption concerns are widespread in many 
countries, both those with successful economies, democratic 
and non-democratic states, and those with and without natural 
resources. 59 Similarly, resource wealth in weaker and non-dem-
ocratic states does not foresee all aspects of the resource curse. 
Some less developed states have avoided major aspects of the 
curse, including Mexico's transition to democracy in 2000.60 The 
concern exists, however, that vast newfound wealth opportuni-
ties from international sources accompanied by lack of financial 
absorptive capacity, lack of transparency due to secrecy, and lack 
of strong institutions to serve as a bulwark pose a risk to positive 
development, democracy, and stability of a state. 61 
CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT AND RISKS 
Many countries are seeing a massive spike in clean natural 
resource development, including the United States, Japan, and 
China, to foster energy independence, reliable energy sources, 
and to combat pollution.62 Currently, the greatest investment in 
clean energy is focused on the states with the biggest gross domes-
tic products ("GDPs") and largest energy needs.63 However, the 
massive increases in international clean energy investment in the 
developing world with weaker institutions, including in Africa 
and Southeast Europe, are subject to the biggest threats to a 
clean energy curse. South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia are esti-
mated to have received almost six billion dollars in clean energy 
investment in 2014, and will reach almost eight billion dollars 
in 2016. 64 These figures are after these states received a total 
of one billion dollars in clean energy investment from 2006 to 
2011. 65 Moreover, the United States is providing six billion dol-
lars in export credits and government financing for clean energy 
development in the Asia-Pacific region and unlocked over one 
and a half billion dollars in clean energy financing through the 
US-Africa Clean Energy Finance Initiative.66 
In 2006, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development launched a Sustainable Energy Initiative to finance 
energy, including clean energy, in Southeast Europe.67 Targeted 
investment of billions of dollars has been directed towards the 
Balkans through various mechanisms, including through the 
Western Balkans Investment Framework. 68 This massive energy 
investment is expected to continue upwards, with billions more 
flowing over the next decade. There are currently five billion 
Euros annually available in loans and grants for clean energy, 
but the generous subsidies will continue to rise as all European 
Union states must have one-fifth of their energy come from 
renewable sources by 2020.69 In 2013, China's investment in 
renewable energy exceeded its investment in traditional resource 
development. 70 Overall, there was $268 billion in clean energy 
investment in 2013 and $310 billion in 2014.71 Compared to the 
$2.3 trillion in petrodollars produced from pumping in 2009, 
clean energy represents a small financial component of the natu-
ral resource market.72 However, even while large energy invest-
ment has been persistent to meet population needs, the new 
and exponentially growing surge of investment in clean energy 
represents a new paradigm and is accompanied by new risks. 
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The massive new investment in renewable energy arose for 
many reasons. Until the drastic downturn in oil prices began in 
the second half of 2014, the high prices for petroleum made the 
need for alternative sources essential for states functioning in 
the global market. 73 It is possible that 2015 will not experience 
a significant increase in renewable energy investment due to 
plunging oil prices, but in the long-run, the massive investment 
will continue.74 The International Energy Association predicts 
that over the next twenty-five years, demand for energy will 
rise by thirty-seven percent and this demand must be met.75 
Investment will continue for a variety of policy considerations, 
including stated desire to curb air pollution caused by fossil 
fuels and national security energy independence through domes-
tic or regional energy production that reduces the need to import 
oil from potentially hostile regimes. Further, in less developed 
states, the need for electrification creates the demand for power 
development from all resources, especially renewable sources. 
More than two-thirds of the population in sub-Saharan Africa 
does not have electricity, including over eight-five percent of 
the rural population.76 More than $300 billion in sub-Saharan 
Africa alone is needed to create universal access to electricity 
by 2030, which is essential for the region's economic growth.77 
While discoveries of oil and gas will enable some of the electri-
fication, clean energy will play a considerable role. Additionally, 
certain clean energy sources will allow some areas to skip ahead 
to electrification without waiting for the expensive and lengthy 
development of electric wire infrastructure. Whole rural villages 
or cities maybe able to be self-contained in solar or wind energy 
production benefitting from off-grid arrangements.78 Just as cel-
lular phones allowed for developing states to leap forward and 
have comprehensive phone service without the need for invest-
ment in traditional phone line infrastructure, localized renewable 
energy development can similarly allow for lesser developed 
regions to achieve independent electrification.79 Energy evolu-
tion is not something new, as the dominant sources of energy 
have consistently changed throughout the centuries. 80 There have 
been changes of dominance, with oil and natural gas replacing 
coal and other traditional fuels, to the sudden recent spike in 
nuclear power during the mid-to-late twentieth century and its 
recent downturn from subsequent concerns following disastrous 
events. 81 New forms of energy can grow quickly when they 
become cost competitive, which has been the recent trend for 
solar and wind energy. 82 
While new forms of energy, especially clean energy, are a net 
benefit to society, the ability of a state to harness resource wealth 
can produce negative impacts when accompanied by massive 
scale and lack of transparency without necessary institutional 
controls. There are already nascent concerns in renewable energy 
regarding corruption and direct economic benefits reaching the 
population. For example, the massive direct subsidies for clean 
energy and cash flows in China is undermining the integrity 
of the process and has led to allegations of corruption. In May 
2014, Wang Jun, head of China's National Energy Association's 
renewable energy department was fired over a criminal investiga-
tion into bribe-taking.83 Similarly, there are concerns regarding 
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the forced investment of large amounts of money into states that 
cannot necessarily absorb the investment and do not have the 
institutions to prevent corruption and ensure that the population 
secures most of the benefits. For example, in Italy, the Mafia 
has infiltrated windfarm development due to lucrative subsides 
and ability to leverage the market.84 Criminal opportunities will 
follow exposed wealth creation and the Mafia has been steal-
ing millions of dollars from the European Union and Italian 
government. 85 There have been examples all over Europe where 
the renewable energy market has been infiltrated by criminal 
elements due to the subsidies.86 In the Canary Islands, eight gov-
ernment officials were indicted for bribery and abuse of office 
connected to securing the lucrative European Union subsidies.87 
Other examples can be found throughout Southern Europe.88 
Renewable energy is even being used to launder criminal money 
from other illicit sectors.89 The extensive fraud and criminality 
demonstrates the need 
destinations, the concerns related to scale, transparency and 
source exist. If there are weak institutions that cannot safeguard 
all aspects of the resource exploitation and revenue, the way 
decisions are made and how the sector is governed still matter. 
Even in renewable energy, corruption and improper govern-
ment actions and benefits are rampant.93 This demonstrates that 
changing from a conventional extractive fuel economy to clean 
energy does not change the governance issues, and therefore the 
inherent threats to the state. 
A parallel concern relates to the complexity of the ten-
dering and contracting process and labor production. Energy 
procurement agreements are of high value (worth potentially 
tens or hundreds of millions), but are subject to asymmetrical 
highly technical information and limited citizen input or over-
sight.94 The renewable energy contracting process is at risk due 
to opaque and complicated financing and subsidies coupled 
with extensive permit-
for strengthened laws 
and regulations, since 




related to subsidies also 
provide opportunities 
for improper gains. 
In India, a return of 
investment criteria 
guaranteeing profit in 
tariff setting provided 
perverse incentives that 
benefitted the investors 
at the expense of the 
public. 90 Renewable 
energy is also starting to 
see some of the corrup-
"While new forms of energy, 
especially clean energy, are a 
net benefit to society, the ability 
of a state to harness resource 
wealth can produce negative 
impacts when accompanied 
by massive scale and lack of 
transparency without necessary 
institutional controls." 
ting and licensing. Any 
time there is secrecy in 
large-scale contracting, 
the citizens of the state 
cannot ensure that no 
bribes were paid, that 
the project was the right 
investment, and that 
the generated wealth 
will benefit the whole 
population.95 Further, a 
system lacking transpar-
ency could drive away 
reputable investors, raise 
costs, waste resources, 
distort markets, and 
divert public interests to 
private gain.96 Any large 
tion-related concerns of 
traditional resources, in which the political elites have access to 
illicit wealth due to centralized control of information, the lack 
of transparency in investment and bribery to secure government 
access. For example, in Albania, key land was purchased by the 
daughter of the Prime Minister right before it was chosen for a 
clean energy project, and separately, the Deputy Prime Minister 
was recorded trying to corrupt a hydroelectric project.91 In that 
case, there was video taken of the minister counting money from 
a briefcase after being asked to favor a certain company in the 
development of a hydroelectric plant.92 
Many of the concerns related to large-scale clean energy 
production mirror the concerns of extractive resource produc-
tion: that centralized control, poor institutions, and lack of delib-
erate, transparent, and inclusive decision making processes may 
produce poor project outcomes and possible serious negative 
impacts. While the clean energy development will be a net posi-
tive for electrification, the climate, and environmental improve-
ment, and the production benefits are not shipped to far away 
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energy project could 
lead to the enrichment 
of a narrow few without the wealth accruing to all. The concerns 
are even greater when one state is selling large amounts of its 
clean energy production to neighboring states. Energy develop-
ment limitations are also applied to the labor market. Natural 
resource development is notorious for having few labor needs 
once the production is established and utilizing foreign labor 
sources during the initial project development phase.97 Thus, the 
domestic population of the state has little interaction with the 
actual energy production and only see the tangible benefits from 
the untaxed or heavily subsidized domestic transmission. 
Finally, as noted, any time enormous unchecked financial 
flows come into a state with insufficient absorptive capacity, 
opportunities for illicit gains, political competition for access to 
the spoils, and diversion of wealth proliferate. Renewable energy 
has opportunities for leakage at various steps in the development 
process, which provide incentives for those in government and 
with access to the wealth to stay in power by any means and limit 
transparency, reinforced through patronage and suppression.98 
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When resource wealth can be appropriated, groups may vie 
for access and control, and rent-seeking behavior may occur.99 
Clean energy is experiencing billions of dollars in infrastructure 
project investment flowing into developing states with weak 
institutions. 100 As shown by the proliferation of clean energy-
related corruption incidents, the current system does not suffi-
ciently protect the financial flows. 
SOLUTIONS 
Some donor states are already taking steps to mitigate the 
potential risks associated with massive energy development in 
states with poorer institutional structures. 101 This is an essential 
step and should receive appropriate attention. However, more 
can and should be done on all fronts to mitigate the core contrib-
uting elements of secrecy and related transparency, state control 
of the source of wealth, and scale. 
EXPANSION OF TRANSPARENCY TO PREVENT SECRECY 
Secrecy and lack of transparency are both possible contrib-
uting causes to the resource curse and potential negative results 
from the curse. To combat the curse, transparency is essential at 
all steps of the renewable energy development. Transparency ini-
tiatives, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
("EITI") 102 and the Publish-What-You-Pay103 campaign, which 
are currently geared solely towards extractive industries, can be 
expanded or have their principles applied to renewable energy. 
These are voluntary multi-stakeholder campaigns supported by 
governments, international corporations, and international non-
governmental organizations. 104 EITI was designed not only to 
help transparency generally, but also to mitigate the resource 
curse through reduction of secrecy and corruption. 105 The EITI 
framework follows essential principles of transparency and gov-
ernment accountability, but the fundamental element is that a 
state joining EITI must disclose revenue and payments received 
from extractive industry corporations operating within its bor-
ders.106 While being voluntary, this initiative helps the state's 
citizens know what revenue is being received and prevent rev-
enue from being hidden. Although EITI compliance is limited by 
its voluntary participation, any opportunity to reduce secrecy in 
renewable energy is similarly vitai. 107 Further, the Publish-What-
You-Pay campaign, a civil society-driven initiative to encourage 
corporate reporting of payments to the state to enable reconcil-
ing of funds, would further enable clean energy transparency. 108 
The key elements besides EITI-like reporting requirements 
are also having transparency in all aspects of the procurement, 
concessions and permitting. This helps ensure that the most 
capable corporation is charged with the renewable energy devel-
opment and increases the likelihood of higher quality service 
delivery and distribution of the benefits. 109 The greatest impact 
though is the reduction of corrupt incidents, such as those expe-
rienced in many South European states. 
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act110 into law in 2010, it included 
in its "Miscellaneous Provisions" a requirement under Section 
1504111 requiring corporations listed with the Security and 
Exchange Commission to disclose payments made to foreign 
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governments for resource extraction rights. 112 This section, also 
known as the Cardin Lugar Amendment, was in direct response 
to Congressional concerns related to the resource curse. 113 
Section 1504 's mandated extractive industry reporting require-
ments are purposefully intended to go beyond the requirements 
of the EITI. Not only does Section 1504 have mandatory report-
ing for the extraction corporations, and not just the states, it 
also requires disclosure about payments at the project level, and 
not just aggregation at the general state level. 114 Thus, the new 
law provides a valuable tool for transparency and reduction of 
secrecy in the extractive industries. The renewable energy sec-
tor would benefit from the law being amended to extend to all 
natural resource development, including clean energy. Since 
there is already concern regarding transparency in payments and 
corruption in clean energy, an expansion of the law's mandate 
could help reduce secrecy and prevent negative effects from this 
burgeoning sector. 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT Focus FOR SOURCE PROTECTIONS 
Since its first utilization in Indonesia in the 1960s, produc-
tion sharing agreements have dominated extractive industry 
contracts and demonstrated a significant shift away from private 
industry ownership and control. 115 These agreements are char-
acterized by having the state as the owner of the resource rights 
and a foreign company provides the technical and financial 
components that the state is lacking. 116 The government retains 
ownership, giving it control over aspects of both development 
and production. 117 While much of the development risk is 
shifted away from the state, the nature of these agreements is 
that the state acts as an administrator and main beneficiary of 
the arrangement. 118 Before the creation of these agreements, 
foreign companies received ownership of the natural resource 
and paid different taxes on market value and income. As dis-
cussed previously, the international shift to production sharing 
agreements and state ownership of resources is argued as being 
directly related to the emergence of the resource curse. 119 For 
this reason, there should be a focus on having privately owned 
clean energy production, services, and delivery, with the state 
collecting revenue via taxation. 
For large-scale projects, the companies that purchase the 
rights and ownership of the production should be reputable and 
experienced international entities. Companies that are publically 
traded entities have requirements regarding operations and prof-
its that help protect the public's interests. 120 While these infor-
mation requirements are not by themselves sufficient to prevent 
against corruption and financial mismanagement, the require-
ments of publicly traded companies are significant compared to 
closely held corporations and state-owned entities that have no 
requirements. Further, taxation may not only help ensure a more 
steady revenue stream, but it also facilitates a stronger democ-
racy and a more accountable government. If the energy revenues 
go directly to the state coffers through state ownership, revenue 
is more difficult to track and the public is more likely to have 
uncertainty regarding government budgets and expenditures. 
Private companies are also more likely to successfully charge 
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and tax the population, thus enabling more citizen oversight of 
delivery of service and citizen demand for a democratic voice. 
As discussed, the failure to tax may have been a cause of the 
resource curse, which helped keep many resource-rich states 
autocratic. 
SMALLER SCALE 
One of the more extreme proposed solutions to the resource 
curse stemming from extractive industries is the "leave it in the 
121 Wh"l ground" approach to address concerns related to scale. 1 e 
abstention from large scale resource development is not going 
to happen, there are coherent arguments for managing the pace 
of investment and development. Though project development 
usually argues for a principle of"more-better-faster", 122 absorp-
tive capacity questions must continue to be raised in states with 
weaker institutions and relatively smaller economies. With 
natural resource indus-
tries, both nonrenewable 
themselves, effectiveness of institutions, policies and regulatory 
frameworks serve as the bulwark when the other factors place 
the state at risk. 127 It has been argued that there can only be a 
resource curse when natural resource wealth occurs in a state 
with low-quality institutions. 128 This results from poor planning 
and quality control by the state government especially when 
investments are made to preserve and extend the authority of the 
governing elite. 129 For these reasons, Ghana quickly attempted 
to strengthen its laws and regulations upon its large discovery of 
. h 1 . t h 130 natural resources; however, changmg t e aws is no enoug . 
Many countries have laws and regulatory structures governing 
energy development and the exploitation of natural resources. 
These laws are usually insufficient, especially with regards to 
international standards of financial management. The lesson 
of poor institutions is that its impact on resource development 
can be stronger than the desire of the state to avoid the resource 
curse. When Sao Tome and 
and renewable, it is usu-
ally argued that the state 
should not race to exploit 
as much of it as quickly as 
it can, but instead plan for 
long-term usage that pro-
vides a steady economic 
stream. 123 It is difficult to 
persuade investors to slow 
development, especially 
as there is enormous pres-
sure to meet certain clean 
energy production goals 
"Clean energy may benefit 
from smaller projects 
with more safeguards or 
singular projects that can 
be developed with less 
Principe, a tiny island state 
of the coast of Africa, 
discovered oil, significant 
effort was made to learn 
from other states' failures 
and avoid the resource 
curse. 131 Sao Tome and 
Principe had a history of 
free multiparty democracy, 
so it brought in inter-
national experts to help 
strengthen its oil revenue 
. . '' government zntruszon. 
by the end of the decade 
and in each subsequent decade. 124 However, the pressure to 
spend and build rapidly can have negative consequences. The 
challenge is to balance, on one hand, the considerable need for 
more energy production and reduction in pollution from fos-
sil fuel energy sources, while on also ensuring that a state has 
sufficient time to absorb the revenue and build the necessary 
systems. The idea of billions of dollars of new investment is 
positive in principle, but needs significant protections and appro-
priate scaling. Clean energy may benefit from smaller projects 
with more safeguards or singular projects that can be developed 
with less government intrusion. Smaller projects could follow 
the trend of micro-hydropower or village specific projects as 
opposed to massive hydro-power dams. 125 An example of a large 
singular project outside government intrusion would be the Lake 
Turkana Wind Power project which, despite its size, benefitted 
from being built in a remote location with little understanding 
from those who would corrupt the process about the magnitude 
of the project. 126 
STRENGTHENED INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
Institutional quality and good governance are some of 
the biggest suspected factors as to whether a state falls victim 
to the resource curse. Though they are not determinative by 
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management law to com-
ply with international best 
practices, including a reserve fund and annual audits. 132 Further, 
the state sought to also adopt transparency best practices. 133 
However, there is sustained and legitimate concerns regarding 
the state's ability to apply the laws and policies, as its lack of a 
functioning judiciary and inexperience dealing with oil compa-
nies left the state vulnerable and limited in its ability to address 
rent-seeking practices. 134 
Many of the funders and donors in clean energy develop-
ment are currently providing technical assistance to help develop 
implementation of policies, regulations, and other reforms 
needed to appropriately manage renewable energy invest-
ment. 135 Further, this technical assistance is being accompanied 
by capacity building of the personnel needed to provide govern-
ment oversight of the resource development. 136 Diverse institu-
tions must be strengthened, and not just those providing direct 
regulatory oversight of the energy source. 137 For example, the 
customs offices, anticorruption agencies, antimonopoly com-
missions, and courts must all be strengthened and have their 
independence protected. 138 It is insufficient to merely address 
the laws and regulatory framework of the state even though those 
cannot also not be neglected. The policies and institutions of a 
state are interlinked in complex ways, and when the institutions 
are weak, even simple policy needs challenge the state. 139 Thus, 
international support for renewable energy development must 
9 
take a comprehensive approach towards improving the laws and 
institutions of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
Renewable energy investment is expected to spike consider-
ably over the next decade with a sudden massive influx of money 
flowing into states with questionable absorptive capabilities. A 
significant amount of investment will be targeted towards these 
developing states in Africa, South Eastern Europe and Asia. 
While some of these states are entrenched democracies with 
preferences toward private ownership and transparency, some 
of states have both the key elements that put natural resource 
rich states at risk in the past and do not have the institutional 
structures to mitigate these negative factors. Just as states wish 
to avoid the resource curse, legal and capacity building efforts 
need to take place to ensure that none face a potential renewable 
resource curse. @ 
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